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Abstract: This essay highlights productive ways in which scholars have reani-
mated the concept of structural power to explain puzzles in international and 
comparative politics. Past comparative scholarship stressed the dependence 
of the state on holders of capital, but it struggled to reconcile this supposed 
dependence with the frequent losses of business in political battles. Interna-
tional  relation (IR) scholars were attentive to the power of large states, but main-
stream IR neglected the ways in which the structure of global capitalism makes 
large companies international political players in their own right. To promote a 
unified conversation between international and comparative political economy, 
structural power is best conceptualized as a set of mutual dependencies 
between business and the state. A new generation of structural power research 
is more attentive to how the structure of capitalism creates opportunities for 
some  companies (but not others) vis-à-vis the state, and the ways in which that 
structure creates leverage for some states (but not others) to play off compa-
nies against each other. Future research is likely to put agents – both states and 
large firms – in the foreground as political actors, rather than showing how the 
structure of capitalism advantages all business actors in the same way against 
non-business actors.
1  Why structural power now?
In the 1970s, the structural power of business was the subject of vibrant debate 
in the social sciences. That discussion raged within Marxist circles, among 
theorists such as Nicos Poulantzas, Fred Block, and Ralph Miliband, but it also 
received a boost from the conversion of the erstwhile pluralist Charles Lindblom, 
whose  Politics and Markets adopted a form of structural power described as the 
 privileged position of business within capitalism. Politicians had to secure invest-
ment, and investment was largely at the discretion of private capital holders. 
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 Regardless of who won elections in the capitalist democracies, the holders 
of capital could  sabotage government policy simply by sitting on their money, 
rather than  investing it.1
Yet structural power fell out of intellectual fashion in the 1980s, even as many 
of the tools government had once used to limit the power of capital were dis-
carded under successive waves of deregulation. Scholars who looked carefully 
could find no privileged position of business: business was characterized as an 
interest group like any other, which won some conflicts and lost others.2 Even 
when business was unified, so too were its opponents, and in these confronta-
tions business groups often lost the political debate.3
Beyond this empirical problem – how could business be structurally power-
ful if it lost in politics so frequently? – there was also a sociology-of-knowledge 
effect. As political scientists became ever more concerned with institutional vari-
ation and its effects on political economy, a clunky variable like structural power 
seemed to lack any variation at all, as it was built into the structure of all capitalist 
countries. Structural power became as suspect in political science as conspiracy 
theories, with which it appeared to share problems of falsifiability.
With occasional exceptions, structural power languished for two decades in 
the less fashionable circles in contemporary political science.4 And then came the 
financial crisis of 2008, which simultaneously shook the foundations of interna-
tional finance and challenged the economic and political models political science 
had used to understand policymaking and power. Since the crisis, structural 
power as an object of scholarly inquiry has enjoyed something of a renaissance. 
There are numerous reasons for this renewal of interest, but two stand out: the 
problem of “too big to fail” and the curious post-crisis strength of the suppos-
edly captured American state in relations with large financial institutions, both 
domestically and internationally.
The idea that some banks were too big to fail without dragging the rest of 
the real economy down with them – thus creating an implicit taxpayer-provided 
insurance for those banks – has been a touchstone of domestic and interna-
tional regulatory reform efforts since the crisis. That banks were in fact too big 
to fail highlights, as only cataclysmic real-word events can, both the poverty of 
political science models based on lobbying influence alone and the wealth of 
other advantages that banks enjoy in domestic political systems. Scholars of the 
1 Przeworski and Wallerstein (1988).
2 Vogel (1987).
3 Smith (2000).
4 Those exceptions include Winters (1996) and Hacker and Pierson (2002).
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 American political economy, looking at the lobbying arsenals of US financial 
institutions and the money spent on electoral campaigns, inferred that money 
spent for political influence is in fact the source of political influence,5 even as 
lobbying studies showed no clear correlation between money spent and out-
comes achieved.6
Moreover, being too big to fail is a structural characteristic, and it was one 
shared by countries other than the US; in many of those countries, money flows 
somewhat less freely into politics than in the US. Yet, when examined in inter-
national comparison, the strongest big American banks, for all their lobbying 
muscle, got hammered by the structure of their bailout in a way that banks in 
Germany and the UK did not.7 Clearly the role of money in American politics does 
not adequately explain the successes of banks, nor their failures. Does structural 
power perhaps provide important purchase here?
A second, empirically jarring result of the crisis is that the American state 
has proved a potent force for both domestic political change and international 
attempts to restrain powerful banks. By ramping up criminal investigations and 
regulatory oversight against large domestic banks, as well as demanding policy 
change from non-American banks that want to do business in the US market, the 
actions of American regulators have demonstrated that globalized markets and 
captured states are not the whole story of the contemporary American political 
economy. To be sure, the activity of American policy in foreign jurisdictions has 
not always pleased other states, as in the case of a US court ruling that under-
mined the ability of Argentina to stick to an earlier debt restructuring.8 Yet these 
activities call for scholars to think about the structural power of states in the 
international system even as they think about that of financial institutions in 
domestic contexts.
This essay highlights some of the productive ways in which scholars are using 
structural power to explain important puzzles in contemporary social science. 
The first section lays out challenges facing structural power research, chal-
lenges that effectively derailed previous attempts to place structural power at the 
center of analysis in political economy. The second section develops a working 
definition of structural power that stresses the notion of reciprocal dependence 
between state and business. The subsequent sections illustrate the way in which 
contemporary empirical research, featured in this special issue, has tried to con-
front these enduring challenges. A final section concludes.
5 Hacker and Pierson (2010); McCarty et al. (2013).
6 Baumgartner et al. (2009).
7 Culpepper and Reinke (2014).
8 Alfaro (2015).
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9 Vogel (1987).
10 Bachrach and Baratz (1962).
11 Swank (1992); Winters (1996).
12 Fairfield (2015a).
2  Challenges to structural power analysis
Before enumerating the advantages of structural power, it is worth revisiting 
some of the charges that critics have leveled against it. Two objections deserve 
explicit consideration. The first revolves around the question of how it is that 
structurally powerful business organizations lose many political battles. The 
second considers whether it is possible, or even conceptually desirable, to dis-
tinguish the structural elements of business power from the more instrumental 
capacities of lobbying and advocacy through which companies pursue their inter-
ests in the political arena.
David Vogel trenchantly stated the first objection in an influential article from 
1987 in which he described business as being an interest group like any other.9 
There were two essential components of Vogel’s critique: first, that business is 
not especially successful in keeping items off the political agenda, even when 
it strongly opposes them; and second, that business power waxes and wanes 
with time and the political preferences of the majority. Controlling the agenda is 
fundamental to debates about power.10 The problem for Vogel is that all groups 
engage in agenda-setting, with varying degrees of success. Just because alterna-
tives to capitalism have not been a prominent part of American political discourse 
does not necessarily mean that business is diabolically suppressing an agenda 
item that would otherwise be discussed and open to majority vote.
This poses a problem for structural power theorists, because many of the 
claims on which structural power has had the most to say – such as those about 
the threat of firms to exit a country if tax rates rise too high – are often about 
the issue of whether the implicit threat to leave poses an unobservable limitation 
on policy possibilities.11 This may well be true, but it is hard to falsify with the 
techniques currently available to political scientists. Structural power theorists 
should not ignore agenda-setting. But the further away one moves from direct 
political consequences of business exercise of influence, the more difficult it 
becomes to identify clearly the causal effect of structural power. Given existing 
standards of evidence in the discipline, agenda-setting is most likely to be dem-
onstrated by showing empirically how the potential for business action closed 
off expressly contemplated policy possibilities, of which there is an observable 
record.12 It is only in this more modest role of observable agenda-setting that the 
first Vogel critique can be parried.
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13 Smith (2000).
14 Hacker and Pierson (2002).
A related problem is that the structure of capitalism in democracy does not 
appear to co-vary in any obvious way with the success of business interest groups 
in politics. The fact that business wins some and loses some was a core element of 
Vogel’s contention that business was simply an interest group like any other. Mark 
Smith’s work provided powerful empirical support to Vogel’s claim, showing that 
even when members of the US. Chamber of Commerce were broadly united on an 
issue, that united position of business did not always prevail.13 The problem here 
is that structural power implies a mechanism of causation that runs through the 
privileged position of business in capitalist societies. But even if business has 
advantages that flow from this structural position, this does not imply either that 
business wins all the time or that business has exactly the same structural advan-
tages in all capitalist systems. Structural power refers to a set of advantages, not 
a pair of loaded dice that always turn up the right way.
To avoid the confusion that the language of structural power has created, 
theories based on structural power must try to show how variation in structural 
power meaningfully, though not deterministically, leads to variation in political 
outcomes. One reason for the success of Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson’s con-
tribution on the development of American social policy lies in the way that it 
correlates variation in the exit options of American business with its ability to 
keep American governments from providing social services.14 So long as busi-
nesses could easily move from New Jersey to Delaware, they were able to cred-
ibly threaten exit. The institutional change of nationalization of social policy 
during the Great Depression undercut this aspect of business structural power, 
paving the way for the development of New Deal policies. Whether the variation 
is temporal within one national case, or whether it is sectoral or cross-national, 
structural power research is most effective when it tests its claims using clear 
specifications of structural power that vary across empirical cases.
An additional challenge in attributing outcomes to structural power is to 
show that structural power is distinct from the preferences of the electorate. 
 Governments may try to pass policies that are congruent with the interests of 
business not because these governments defer to structural power, but because 
the preferences of their constituents are satisfied by such policy change. Struc-
tural power may well be operative under such favorable political circumstances, 
but empirically it is difficult to disentangle the effects of business power from 
public opinion in such settings. It is more compelling to highlight how structural 
power allows business interests to achieve policy outcomes that are either elec-
torally costly to a government or unpopular with public opinion. In other words, 
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these empirical constellations constitute harder tests for hypotheses based on 
structural power.15 As a pragmatic matter of research design bang for the buck, 
accounts of structural power do best when they show the ways in which the struc-
tural power of business leads to outcomes that run in visible contrast to public 
opinion or governmental preference.
Within the business power literature itself, structural power has conven-
tionally been contrasted with what has come to be called instrumental power: 
those non-core functions of the firm on which business relies to attain a politi-
cal edge, such as campaign donations and the use of lobbying, either directly as 
a firm or collectively, through business associations.16 Structural power results 
from the fact that firms and capital holders control the investment decisions on 
which the economy depends for growth.17 Even if these two dimensions of busi-
ness power are conceptually clear, they are however extremely difficult to dis-
entangle in practice: if a political decision is made not to raise tax rates, is that 
because of the likely potential disinvestment effects (structural power) or instead 
because a business lobbyist made a particularly persuasive case about its likely 
effect on investment (instrumental power)? Any attempt to build on the theory of 
structural power must wrestle with the problem of the frequently observationally 
equivalent effects of instrumental and structural power.
Conceptually, some scholars have challenged the very utility of the dis-
tinction between structural power and instrumental power. Hindmoor and 
McGeechan noted that the bank bailouts that resulted from the crisis of 2008 
were certainly due to the structural position of banks’ being too big to fail.18 Yet, 
they argued, that structural position was itself a product of earlier lobbying 
activity by banks – instrumental power – in deregulating the sector. Structural 
power is for them, therefore, a product of instrumental power, not independent 
of it. Stephen Bell has argued in a different vein that structural power depends 
on the perceptions of policymakers and of the public, which may depend in turn 
on the instrumental political action undertaken by business.19 While these schol-
ars underline the empirical difficulty of doing research on structural power, they 
do not articulate a way around the challenge, nor do they successfully make the 
case for abandoning the distinction altogether.
The difference between structural and instrumental power has important 
consequences for how politics actually works. If instrumental power and the 
15 Bennett and Checkel (2014).
16 Culpepper (2011).
17 Block (1980); Przeworski and Wallerstein (1988).
18 Hindmoor and McGeechan (2013).
19 Bell (2012).
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role of money in politics is a primary source of disproportionate business influ-
ence on lawmaking, then policies aimed at remedying this disproportion would 
take aim at the role of spending money for lobbying and access to policymak-
ers. But if that difference has roots not in instrumental power, but instead in 
the structural position of enterprises or capital holders in the economy, then a 
policy aimed at lessening any disproportionate influence would target instead 
national rules for the size of companies in a sector and ways for legal jurisdic-
tions to limit exit options, as Farrell and Newman discuss in their contribution 
to this issue.20
Any attempt to identify the role of structural power in action must wrestle 
with the problems reviewed here. First, demonstrating structural influence is dif-
ficult to show when the preferences of business correlate with the preferences of 
governments and/or public opinion, unless it is phrased as conspiracy theory. 
Empirical instantiation of structural power is most likely to be found there-
fore where it pushes against substantial opposition in government or in public 
opinion. Second, theories of structural power should specify the sources of vari-
ation in structural power and show how that variation helps account differences 
in outcomes. And finally, demonstrating the effect of structural power as a causal 
variable usually involves distinguishing it conceptually from instrumental power 
and developing a strategy to operationalize this conceptual distinction in empiri-
cal research.
3  Structural power as reciprocal dependence
Conventional definitions of structural power in political science underline the 
fact that capitalism requires private investment, and that governments in capital-
ist democracies are therefore dependent on creating the conditions under which 
holders of capital will be willing to invest.21 Thus, the structural power of capital 
involves the dependence of the state on private investors. In the open economy, 
this notion of structural power is often rephrased, with disinvestment taking the 
form of exit from the domestic economy, presumably to invest in countries with 
a more propitious regulatory or fiscal environment.22 Whether in the closed or 
open economy formulations, however, the constant of structural power is that it 
is perceived as a one-way street: capital holders exercise power over politicians 
20 Farrell and Newman (2015).
21 Lindblom (1977); Block (1980); Przeworski and Wallerstein (1988).
22 Winters (1996); Garrett (1998).
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running the state by virtue of the fact that the latter depend for their success on 
the former.
This unidirectional conception of structural power is one reason that the 
debates in international political economy (IPE) have been so divorced from those 
in comparative political economy (CPE). In IPE, structural power is a trait of states 
that occupy a powerful structural position in the international system. Thus, for 
Susan Strange, structural power was a capacity mainly inherent in a few large 
states – above all the US – to exercise influence over other state and non-state 
actors, by virtue of their role at the center of the international system.23 While 
Strange’s conception allows for structural power to be held by non-state actors, 
the central thrust of structural power in IPE scholarship is to focus on the role 
played by the US, because its sits at the center of the web of international trading 
and financial links and institutions.24 For mainstream IPE, structural power is 
something that a few lucky states exercise over others, not something of which 
they themselves are objects.25
It is difficult to spell out a definition of structural power that encompasses 
what both CPE and IPE scholars are talking about, because of the differences 
in the structures about which they are writing. For CPE scholars, the structure 
in question is that of the capitalist economy; for IR scholars, it is the anarchic 
international system, with balances of power that lie both in economics and in 
non-economic sources of force projection. However, firms and states both play 
in the international economy. Leaving aside the security features of the interna-
tional system, there is scope between IPE and CPE to have a productive conversa-
tion about the way in which domestic and international market actors and states 
interact.
Rather than focusing exclusively on structural power as a resource held by 
private capital holders over the state, as in past CPE work, it will be more pro-
ductive for scholars of CPE and IPE to conceptualize structural power as a set of 
mutual dependencies between holders of capital and the administratively super-
ordinate authority – most often, but not always, a state. While structural power 
theorists have written at great length about the ways in which the state is depend-
ent on holders of capital, they have focused much less on the ways in which large 
holders of capital depend on finding a regulatory environment in which they can 
generate a return from their capital.26
23 Strange (1996: p. 4).
24 Helleiner (2014); Kirshner (2014).
25 Cf. Andrews (1994) and Gill and Law (1989) for exceptions.
26 Marsh (1983).
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One important recent example of the dependency of national economies 
on the size of the financial sector is the size of bank bailout packages: ceteris 
paribus, the bigger the financial sector of a country, the larger the size its bailout 
as a proportion of GDP (Reinke 2014). These banks were often too big to fail, at 
least without catastrophic consequence for their economies. Yet it is also true 
that the American market is a large and lucrative one for many banks. The fact 
that the largest players in the American banking market make most of their 
profit in the US means that these banks are dependent on regulatory goodwill 
of American authorities. They are, in other words, dependent on the American 
state, just as the American state is dependent on them.27 The structure of the 
capitalist system is one in which each depends on the other. Studying structural 
power means being attentive to the political implications of both elements of 
this mutual dependency.
What this means in practice is that accounts of structural power can be espe-
cially penetrating when they highlight the way in which features of the recipro-
cal structural relationship influence the action of both states and businesses. In 
recent years we have seen this mutual vulnerability influence policies in impor-
tant ways. Beyond the case of the bank bailouts, we can also observe this dynamic 
at work in the case of Swiss banking secrecy laws, analyzed by Patrick Emmeneg-
ger in this issue, in which the American government used its ability to threaten 
the indictment of Swiss banks to end this longstanding Swiss practice, one that 
had proved immune to previous international pressures.28
The story told by Emmenegger is not exclusively a story of American finan-
cial power, however. The US wanted to threaten these banks without actually 
causing the substantial damage to the economy that a formal criminal indict-
ment would have created. The US government stands at the center of the web 
of global finance, but if it tears down several large players, it risks significantly 
damaging itself. As Emmenegger argues, the play of structural power is neither 
the stuff of conspiracies nor of unobservable winks and nods, but instead of 
carefully calibrated, empirically observable shows of force through which a state 
coerces compliance from large financial institutions, while trying not to shoot 
itself in the foot. His account shows how one state can discipline firms, and 
the way he employs structural power is especially credible because the story is 
embedded in both the power and the vulnerability of states that want to pressure 
large financial institutions. One way for future scholarship to be clearer about 
the limits of structural power is to keep one eye on this mutual interdependence 
that underlies it.
27 Culpepper and Reinke (2014).
28 Emmenegger (2015).
Authenticated | pepper.culpepper@eui.eu author's copy
Download Date | 10/22/15 4:42 PM
400      Pepper D. Culpepper
4   Distinguishing structural and instrumental 
power
If business is merely a group with well-resourced advocacy organizations, or even 
a set of super-rich individuals such as the Koch brothers in the US, then structural 
power is not necessary to understand their influence in politics. The variable of 
interest is resources, and these individuals and organizations have access to espe-
cially abundant resources. While business associations may be able to call on 
fewer members than mass advocacy organizations such as the AARP or the NRA, 
the deep pocketbooks of their members mean they still face these mass organiza-
tions with no resource disadvantage, and often a sizeable disparity of economic 
means in their favor. This may or may not be a problem for American democracy, 
depending on one’s priors about the meaning of the political equality of citizens. 
But it is certainly a problem for those working on the importance of structural 
power, whose theoretical concern is with the economic weight of Koch Industries 
in the American economy and how that position influences American environ-
mental policies, rather than the spending of the Koch brothers themselves, which 
is simply their instrumental power.
Scholars currently working on the problem of how structural power influ-
ences politics have approached this problem in various ways. The first is to set 
up a research design in which case selection creates variation in the expected 
outcomes, depending on whether or not instrumental or structural power is more 
decisive for the outcome to be explained. This is the strategy pursued in Culpep-
per and Reinke’s comparison of bank bailout strategies across the US, the UK, 
France and Germany.29 In all cases, the instrumental power of large banks was 
substantial, but where that power was highest – in the US and in France – was 
also where large banks possessed relatively lower structural power. Culpepper 
and Reinke were able to show that the outcome of interest, a collective banking 
solution that forced strong banks to share the upside risks of bailouts with tax-
payers, was observed only in the cases with lower structural power of financial 
institutions. Their process-tracing evidence, moreover, showed how structural 
power was in evidence, while instrumental power was not.
This is an effective strategy, but it is one that was made possible by being able 
to look at cross-national variation during a relatively unusual event, the 2008 
financial crisis. In many other empirical instances, particularly when scholars are 
looking within a single country case, the strategy of taking contrasting outcome 
predictions of instrumental and structural power is not feasible. In this case, one 
29 Culpepper and Reinke (2014).
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can follow Hall’s strategy of systematic process analysis by specifying in detail 
how the observable implications of the process will differ depending on whether 
instrumental or structural power is at play.30 This is the strategy adopted by Tasha 
Fairfield in her book on tax policy in Latin America.31 She establishes clear criteria 
of policymaker perceptions of the risk of disinvestment to evaluate empirically 
the role played by structural power in agenda-setting stage from 1991 to 2010; she 
finds its importance to be limited in comparison with instrumental power. Her 
study of Chile’s 2014 reform for this special issue, however, shows how structural 
and instrumental power mutually reinforced the efforts of employers to win con-
cessions in congress.32
Yet, as Fairfield shows, business is often most effective where structural and 
instrumental power are both strong. Such a finding can establish the exercise 
of business power in politics, but it has difficulty apportioning causal weight 
between instrumental and structural aspects of power. This dilemma has led 
some to dismiss the role of structural power as simply a signal, which the holders 
of structural power have to amplify via their engagement in costly instrumental 
political action.33
Rather than trying to distinguish the effect of structural from instrumental 
power, some scholars have found it more fruitful to see how the two work together, 
even while maintaining the conceptual distinction between them. Kevin Young, 
in his contribution to this issue, uses the case of American financial regulation to 
consider the challenges of assessing structural power arguments focused on spe-
cific industries or firms.34 His first analytical move is to push for conceptual clarity 
by distinguishing structural prominence – which refers descriptively to positional 
or magnitude features of a firm or a sector that give it a prominent place within an 
economy – and the potential to alter the behavior of other actors in the system by 
dint of that that structural prominence. Using data on both agenda-setting and 
preference attainment before the US. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
Young’s results suggest a nuanced story: more prominent firms do seem to be 
favored in the agenda-setting stage, which is consistent with a structural power 
argument. However, in terms of preference attainment, there is little evidence 
that structurally powerful firms get more of what they want, particularly when 
they are critical of the status quo. It seems to be the case that those firms that 
do best in terms of preference attainment are both structurally prominent and 
30 Hall (2003).
31 Fairfield (2015a).
32 Fairfield (2015b).
33 Hacker and Pierson (2002).
34 Young (2015).
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actively engaged in the exercise of instrumental power, suggesting the promise 
of further exploration of how structural and instrumental power reinforce each 
other.
5  States, finance and structural power
The reciprocal dependence between states and firms entailed in structural power 
calls for a closer dialogue between those working in comparative and interna-
tional political economy. IPE scholars have written with great fluency about the 
way in which the international status of the dollar as a reserve currency has rein-
forced the power of the US in the international system. For these scholars, the 
principal interest of the structural power that inheres in the American position 
as the center of the dollar system is the ability of the US to get what it wants from 
other states. But, as Susan Strange has noted especially acutely, the resources 
of US structural power also allow the US in certain circumstances to push back 
against the loss of control over large financial institutions that many domestic 
jurisdictions have experienced with the march of financial globalization.35
Exhibit A of this mutual dependence appears in Patrick Emmenegger’s study 
in this issue of the demise of Swiss banking secrecy.36 The Swiss state, in support 
of its large banking sector, had long vaunted the right of secrecy of its large banks, 
to the consternation of international policymakers attempting to cooperate in the 
fight against tax evasion. As Emmenegger shows, these Swiss banks were them-
selves dependent on continued access to the dollar-based financial system. This 
dependence allowed the US government to bring pressure to bear on the Swiss 
banks – and thereby on the Swiss government – through the threat of criminal 
indictment of the banks, which ultimately led to the sharp curtailment of the 
renowned Swiss practice of banking secrecy.
Emmenegger’s analysis shows that the long arm of US law, sustained inter 
alia by the dependence of international large banks on US dollar-clearing, can 
also be used to extend the reach of US regulation even to small banks that have 
no real business presence in the US. Thus the US was able to indict, and force the 
collapse of, the small Swiss bank WEGELIN, whose co-owner was a prominent 
advocate of maintaining Swiss banking secrecy. This crisp operationalization of 
structural power allows Emmenegger to show the dynamics of radical change in 
domestic politics by tracing the ways in which mutual dependence permits the 
US state to pressure financial institutions to change their ways.
35 Strange (1996).
36 Emmenegger (2015).
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William Winecoff adopts a different metric – network centrality – to assess 
how the financial crisis has affected the structural power of the US.37 Winecoff 
depicts the structure of the global banking network, using ties based on the 
amount of assets national banking sectors hold in each other. Winecoff’s precise 
definition of structure does not focus on the exercise of structural power, but it 
provides evidence of a continued American centrality to the international finan-
cial network that may well help account for the reinforced international regu-
latory activism of the US government post-crisis. Winecoff’s network analysis 
shows that the crisis actually reinforced the central position of the US, and to a 
lesser extent the position of the UK, in the international financial network.
The promise of Winecoff’s network analysis, and indeed of network analysis 
generally for the study of structural power, is that it offers precise and measura-
ble concepts of structure and centrality. To the extent that these measures line up 
closely with what we mean when we talk about the structural power of business, 
or of states against business, this is a welcome advance. A substantial analytical 
challenge remains, as the lineaments of structural power may not be fully repre-
sented by network position alone. Network theorists have developed measures 
of centrality and prestige that Winecoff deploys to promising effect. An impor-
tant next step in the research program is to connect changes in structural power 
with political outcomes over time and across countries, such that we can begin to 
assess the correlation of changes in structural power with a variety of potentially 
observable implications.
6  Structural power and the forums of politics
Structural power ties states and business in relationships of mutual dependency. 
For both parties, this dependency creates vulnerabilities. It is these vulnerabili-
ties that have been the subject of most of the work on structural power. Yet the 
international capitalist system is not a sclerotic network in which the structural 
location of firms and the relationship of states to those firms are determined 
solely by resource endowments, which are slow to change. The rules that define 
the system are instead a subject of ongoing political struggle.
In the literature on the globalization of finance, the predominant view has 
been that the mobility of capital constrains states from being able to make the 
policies they prefer.38 This literature has possibly undervalued the resources of 
37 Winecoff (2015).
38 Winters (1996); Garrett (1998); Mosley (2000).
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state strength, as noted in research by Emmenegger, Culpepper and Reinke, and 
Young.39 It may also have imputed to international companies the concerns of 
political economists, who spend their days thinking about power and who can 
control whom. Firm managers are concerned with this problem much less than 
they are about how to make money. They are of course concerned about their 
possible vulnerability to state regulators, but only insofar as it affects their future 
profitability. It is perfectly imaginable that companies are willing to accept a 
loss of regulatory control for access to lucrative markets. When the rules of the 
game are up for negotiation, regulators and firms battle to exercise control. But 
while regulators are almost always concerned about being able to exercise state 
power, this may be a relatively less important consideration for firm managers 
and owners.
This asymmetry is of interest because firms and regulators engage in this 
game in a variety of policy domains in the contemporary international economy. 
The capacity to leave a political jurisdiction – the exit option – is at the root of the 
potential for globalization to increase the structural power of business vis-à-vis 
states. Yet as Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman show in their contribution to 
this issue, states and international organizations can push back by making exit 
from a given jurisdiction more difficult, thereby decreasing the structural power 
of business.40 Farrell and Newman call this power to shape exit options “struc-
turing power,” and they explore the play of structuring power in debates over 
privacy regulation and accounting standards in both the US and the European 
Union.
Farrell and Newman’s focus on structuring power emphasizes that the con-
flict of national regulatory systems creates the possibility for distributional strug-
gles between firms that have more or less to gain from being governed by different 
sets of rules, as it does between regulators who want to prevent exit and firms that 
want to elude regulatory oversight. Thus the contest over structuring power is 
between firms themselves, which battle over whose rules they would rather play 
by, as well as between firms and particular states trying to extend their jurisdic-
tion over the economic activity of those firms. One of the exciting insights of this 
article for the research frontier on structural power is to think creatively about 
the sorts of variations in exit options that are affecting large firms with an inter-
national presence.
The question of what firms want and how those preferences influence 
international politics is at the heart of the article by Rawi Abdelal.41 Abdelal’s 
39 Emmenegger (2015); Culpepper and Reinke (2014); and Young (2012).
40 Farrell and Newman (2015).
41 Abdelal (2015).
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empirical study of gas markets that tie European countries and Russia shows 
that the border between the commercial policy of firms and geopolitical battles 
is much more porous than the contemporary literature on international relations 
would have us believe. Abdelal argues that many of the most important choices 
about the construction of gas pipelines – gas pipelines freighted with geopolitical 
consequences for the major European countries – were the result of the decades-
long relationship between Gazprom and a handful of European energy compa-
nies. How those companies interpreted the conflict between Ukraine and Russia 
over gas supply, and not how mass publics or government leaders interpreted 
them, were the driving factors behind European political moves about gas supply, 
even if these moves were investment decisions made by private companies, not 
lawmakers in parliament. Abdelal’s view of structure and the power of firms 
reminds us that the incentives and mutual histories of firms and their manag-
ers are fundamental to the way in which large companies exercise influence over 
political outcomes.
7  Conclusion
Crises and their aftermaths provide fertile ground for political scientists to evalu-
ate their own tools in light of the changes in the real world they are trying to 
explain. The recent global financial crisis and the ongoing bank and sovereign 
debt crisis associated with it in the Eurozone have led many scholars to reach 
back into the toolbox of structural power to help understand some puzzling 
developments. The articles in this special issue demonstrate that this is a broad 
research frontier. A synthetic look at them raises several questions of general 
interest, for scholars interested in employing the analysis of structural power as 
for skeptics wondering whether this corpse from debates between Marxists and 
pluralists would best be left undisturbed.
What emerges most clearly from this review is that structural power has a 
labeling problem, if not a toxic brand name recognition. The structural power 
of business refers to the ways in which large companies and capital holders – in 
practice very often the same thing – gain influence over politics without neces-
sarily trying to, because of the way they are built into the process of economic 
growth. This is the sense in which its advantages are structural. But the adjective 
“structural” has biased conversations about structural power such that the focus 
on agency in structural power explanations has almost vanished.42 The claim 
42 Cf. Paster (2015).
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that structural power is at work implies neither a deterministic outcome nor that 
the exercise of structural power must happen automatically and apolitically.43 If 
structural power is to prove a useful addition to contemporary theories of poli-
tics, those who would use it need to be attentive to this labeling problem and the 
issues that get smuggled in by using the adjective “structural.”
The articles brought together in this issue suggest at least three lines of 
inquiry that can help clarify the meaning of “structure” in structural power analy-
sis. First, several of the articles in this issue break with the dominant understand-
ing of an earlier generation of literature that had a class-theoretic focus – which 
is to say, that structural power was part of the advantages of the entire class of 
capitalists. The contributions of Emmenegger, Farrell and Newman, and Young 
all deal in interesting ways with potential or real cleavages in the business com-
munity. Structural power concerns the relationship between states and firms, but 
it is something that can be used by one company or set of companies against the 
interests of others, as against the state. In other words, a new generation of struc-
tural power research is likely to be much more attentive to how the structure of 
capitalism creates opportunities for some companies (but not others) vis-à-vis the 
state, at the same time that it creates leverage for some states (but not others) to 
use in order to play off companies against each another. Future structural power 
research is more likely to put agents in the foreground as political actors taking 
advantage of the resources provided by structural power, rather than to show 
how the structure of capitalism advantages all business actors in the same mech-
anistic way against non-business actors.
A second issue for future research involves the knotty question of how to 
understand the way in which structural business power works together with that 
power which is not structural – instrumental power, in the infelicitous concep-
tual language inherited from past debates. Disentangling the two remains dif-
ficult. One issue to watch is whether the most mileage is to be gained by trying 
to distinguish the separate effects of instrumental and structural power, as in the 
work by Culpepper and Reinke, or instead to explore them as they work together, 
as in the analyses by Fairfield and Young in this special issue. Which sort of anal-
ysis will prove most fruitful remains an open question.
A third and final issue that emerges from these articles, especially that by 
Winecoff but also that by Young, is the possible future role of network analysis 
in exploring the claims of structural power empirically. Network analysis may 
offer advantages in specifying precisely and transparently what the structure in 
structural power means, and how different sorts of position in that structure may 
43 Culpepper and Reinke (2014).
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confer discrete advantages on certain actors. What remains to be seen is how 
well the different sorts of ties established between nodes in network analysis cor-
respond to the theorized ties by which companies and capital holders occupy 
the privileged position elaborated by Lindblom.44 If those ties and structures can 
indeed be shown to correspond closely to the character of capitalist structure – 
which is a big “if” – then network analysis represents an important area for the 
structural power agenda to advance empirically.
Structural power analysis has also suffered from the lack of dialogue 
between the fields of international and comparative political economy. While 
subfields are often resistant to sustained dialogue, this separation has been 
particularly costly because scholars in both fields have tended to focus only 
on one side of the coin. For CPE scholars, that one-sided account has stressed 
the way in which the privileged position of business stacks the deck in favor of 
business-friendly outcomes, leaving underemphasized the simultaneous and 
related power of regulators to pressure firms because those firms are depend-
ent for their future income on access to certain markets. For IPE scholars, the 
unilateral temptation has been to stress the dominant position of the US with 
respect to other countries and their banks, without any heed to the way in which 
the American government must be deeply sensitive to the effects of its policies 
on international holders of capital, including its own giant banks. Conceptual-
izing structural power as a set of reciprocal dependencies among states and the 
large firms operating within their regulatory jurisdiction represents one way to 
develop a more balanced notion of how structural power operates in the global 
capitalist economy.
These considerations about the reciprocal character of structural depend-
ence are of a general character, but they have special resonance for discussions 
of the most important countries in the international system, and above all the 
US. Nowhere is the distinction between CPE and IPE more glaring than in the 
contrasting portrayals of the American political economy: the former depicts that 
system as hopelessly captured by the lobbies of large businesses and the super-
rich people who lead them, while the latter sees the American state as a contin-
ued island of power in the international system, one that is able to pursue rogue 
banks across international borders without regard to the finer points of interna-
tional law. There is a significant degree of truth in both pictures. Understanding 
how they can simultaneously coexist is a task that should be on the agenda of 
anyone interested in understanding the character and limits of structural power 
in contemporary political economy.
44 Lindblom (1977).
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in contemporary political science. I am grateful to the Europe in the World research area, part of 
the Global Governance Programme at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the 
EUI, which provided financial support for the workshop. Philip Rocco has been a great source of 
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issue, though none of them is responsible for the interpretations I have imposed on their ideas. 
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